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Auteur: Christopher TANCREDI

Co-Auteur(s): Yael SHARVIT, UCLA, USA

Qualities and Translations

Abstract/Résumé: Qualities and Translations Based on new ellipsis-in-attitudes data, we argue that: (a) in addition to de re, de dicto and de qualitate (Cresswell & von Stechow 1983’s de re properties) we need de translato; and (b) de qualitate is constrained by Kaplanian (1968) “vividness” generalized. New data. Consider (1) and (2), both true in Scenario (3). (1) John believes that 7 is prime. (2) Bill believes 26 is prime. (3) John’s belief: “only 1 and 7 divide 7”. John lacks the word and concept prime. Bill’s belief: “prime means equaling x^3 – 1 for some x”. Analyzed de re or de dicto, (1) and (2) are false in (3). (1) is true de qualitate via acquaintance with the property "λwλx.1 and x are the only things that divide x in w" (see (4) for a C&vS implementation), but there is no pure de qualitate interpretation that will make (2) true. For (2) to be true, the word "prime" must be interpreted as Bill interprets it, i.e. de translato, not as the speaker interprets it. (4) [[(1)]] =(de qualitate) ∃ acquaintance relation R: (i) ιP: R(John, P, @) = PRIME, and (ii) ∀w compatible with John’s beliefs in @ (= actual world), ιP: R(John, P, w) holds of 7 in w. Ellipsis shows the need to distinguish de translato from de qualitate in semantics rather than only pragmatics. (5) is infelicitous in Scenario (3), which would not follow if de translato vs. de qualitate were a purely pragmatic, non-semantic, distinction. (Cf. elided pronouns: independent pragmatic identification in the two clauses would create more ambiguity than is found.) (5) John believes that 7 is prime. Bill does too. (5) is felicitous when John and Bill have the “same” belief; e.g. when they both believe “1 and 7 are the only things that divide 7”, or when for each z ∈ {John, Bill}, ∃Pz: z’s belief is “prime = Pz and Pz holds of 7”, but not in “mixed” cases such as (3). Key to analyzing de translato is relativizing interpretation to i-languages (cf. Shan 2010 on partial quotation). Schwager (2005) objects that C&vS de qualitate readings are too weak: John believes 7 is prime is predicted true even if John was never exposed to the concept prime. Kaplan’s solution for a parallel problem involving individuals was to require the acquaintance relation to be “vivid”. We generalize this solution as (6), incorporating C&vS’s cognitive contact requirement, where a vivid concept cannot depend on the identity of any world other than the actual world @. (6) An acquaintance relation R relates an individual x, an individual / property P and a world w, R(x,P,w), only if x has a vivid concept C that determines the extension of P, and x is in cognitive contact with a part of that extension. (7) a. “good” C: λxλw. only 1 and x divide x in w b. “bad” C: λxλw. only 1 and x divide x in w if w=@, else x is a horse in w